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Abstract
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identi-
fied in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context
is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental ar-
rangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be
taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement
may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly
performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the ex-
perimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance
in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of
action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp
measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the
completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description
and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen
approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrange-
ments corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum
observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of con-
textuality in quantum mechanics arises via the noncommutativity in
general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear,
providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situa-
tions explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in
relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere
in physics.
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1 Introduction
Quantum contextuality has long been and continues to be of interest in the
foundations of quantum physics (cf., e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]) and has more re-
cently been so in the extension of the mathematics of quantum theory beyond
physics (cf., e.g. [8] and references therein, [9]). There are various claims as
to the ultimate origin of the notion of quantum contextuality the validity of
which depends on the way measurement context is defined; recently, various
differing formulations of contextuality have appeared, cf., e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10].
Here, I argue that the first sense of the contextuality of physical measurement
emerged from context as implicitly introduced to physics by Niels Bohr and
Werner Heisenberg, founders of the Copenhagen approach to quantum me-
chanics, as they grappled with the nature of the quantum state and properties
in relation to causation in the late 1920s and 1930s and continued to articu-
late the role of context in quantum mechanics into the late 1950s, although
those workers did not refer to context by name, likely because they viewed it
as an inherent feature of the Copenhagen approach. After the implications
of context were more widely explored by others—most notably John S. Bell
[1], Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker [2]—who explicitly considered context
in relation to so-called hidden-variables models—it became a more indepen-
dent notion; it was named subsequently by those following the lead of these
pioneering investigations.
The simplest and broadest notion of contextuality in quantum mechan-
ics is the dependence of outcomes of measurements on other measurements on
the same system. Here, the origin and basis of the notion of context in Copen-
hagen approach is shown in Sections 2 and 3, with it defined as an equivalence
class of experimental arrangements for measurements of sets of compatible
observables at the end of Section 3 after historical background informing this
definition is given. Contextuality, which can depend on the theoretical setting
under consideration, is then articulated in terms of such contexts. A clear
mathematical setting for its definition is provided by work of Paul Dirac and,
especially, John von Neumann, which clarified the nature and role of quantum
observable, allowing context a more formal setting for measurement theory. A
context here is an equivalence class of physical arrangements for the measure-
ment of a set of observables under which the statistics of outcomes of measure-
ments of any one of its observables is left unchanged by the measurement of its
others, which relate to later, more special senses of context. The historically
most important of these is the sort of Bell and of Kochen and Specker who
later considered noncontextual models in physics, the latter showing that it is
impossible to attribute context-independent outcomes to measurements that
in quantum mechanics are represented formally by mutually commuting sets
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of self-adjoint operators, through the consideration of different contexts.
Von Neumann’s definition of the quantum observable enabled the com-
patibility of observables to be specificed by a sets of sharp measurements rep-
resented by commuting self-adjoint operators, that is, Hermitian operators Aˆ
and Bˆ such that [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0ˆ, and incompatibility by the negation of this con-
dition; if two observables commute then they can belong to the same context,
and cannot if they do not commute. This also allows the relationship between
the Copenhagenist version of context and later theory-independent senses of
context to be seen; a theory-independent notion of context has been defined
as a set of compatible measurements, where two measurements A and B are
compatible if there is a measurement AB such that, for any system state, the
measurement of AB yields exactly the same measurement statistics for A and
B as given by measurements on A and B separately, which in turn allows for
the probing of nonclassical behavior in hidden-variables theories which might
explain the same phenomenon as standard quantum mechanics [10]. It can
be the case that two different such contexts share the same measurement,
i.e. A and B may be compatible and provide one context and B and C may
be compatible and provide another, while A and C are incompatible, demon-
strating the dependence, in general, of measurement outcomes on context. In
such cases, it becomes impossible to ascribe definite outcomes to sharp mea-
surements independently of context, that is, contextuality is evident. This is
discussed in Section 4.
2 Historical Background
In the Copenhagen approach, the significance of context became evident due
to wider natural-philosophical considerations that led to questions about the
completeness of the quantum mechanical state description. That the pure
quantum state ψ can be represented by the projection operator Pψ or the
vector |ψ〉 of complex Hilbert space H was accepted early in the history of the
theory and is an aspect of the primary principle of quantum mechanics, the
superposition principle, cf. [11]. However, that predictions of future values of
system properties based on this state are in general probabilistic rather than
deterministic, in accordance with the Born rule, led to a lasting controversy
regarding the proper understanding of the quantum state and its relation to
the measurement of system properties, cf. [12] Chs. 1-3, [13], Ch. 3.
In the preceding era dominated by classical physics, the fundamental
law of motion provided a form of determinism famously captured in the fol-
lowing statement of Laplace. “We ought. . . to regard the present state of the
universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which
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is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend
all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the
beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data
to analysis. . . for it, nothing would be uncertain, and the future, as well as
the past, would be present to its eyes” [14], a more detailed development of
ideas that had been introduced earlier by Leibniz. Thus, in classical physics
identical, complete and maximally precise state preparations for all properties
would certainly lead to identical, perfectly predictable individual measurement
outcomes, and measurement context played a reducible role, at best. The re-
alization of the fundamentally probabilistic character of quantum predictions
led, by contrast, to the questioning of the completeness of the quantum state
description and the reconsideration of measurement context as concomitant to
the irreducibility of its probabilities, as discussed further in the next section.
Associated with the vectorial nature of this state is that quantum physi-
cal magnitudes are not represented immediately by jointly precisely specifiable
real functions as are those of, for example, classical position x and momen-
tum p or functions thereof, but are instead symbolized by operators Oˆ act-
ing on Pψ or |ψ〉 (cf. [15] Sects. III.1, III.5) and are only connected with
measurement outcomes indirectly, for example, via the eigenvalue–eigenstate
link introduced by Heisenberg and articulated more fully by Dirac. Moreover,
Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy, the relation ∆x∆p ≥ ~/2, and similar
later-derived relations express in-principle limitations on the precision of joint
determination of position and momentum in contradiction to the deterministic
ideal, and led to the reconsideration of the way that magnitudes are related
to the manner of their measurement [16, 17]. Heisenberg concluded that in
quantum mechanics “in the sharp formulation of the law of causality, ‘If we
know the present exactly, we can calculate the future,’ it is not the consequent
that is wrong, but the antecedent. We cannot in principle get to know the
present in all determining data” ([16], p. 197).
In response to Einstein’s expressed desire to find a way of determin-
ing the values of sets of noncommuting quantum observables, Bohr engaged
the question of the completeness of the quantum state description of physical
systems by Pψ or |ψ〉 as follows. “Notwithstanding the power of quantum
mechanics as a means of ordering an immense amount of evidence regarding
atomic phenomena, its departure from accustomed demands of causal explana-
tion has naturally given rise to the question whether we are here concerned with
an exhaustive description of experience. . . ” [18], pp. 3-4. Although quantum
mechanics fails to meet the requirements of the classical deterministic ideal in
that identical perfect state preparations and corresponding specifications lead,
in general, to different measurement outcomes, Bohr and Heisenberg did not
view quantum mechanics as statistical in the same sense of classical statistical
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mechanics. Indeed, the irreducibly probabilistic character of quantum predic-
tions was “seen or interpreted as an unavoidable consequence of the irreducible
role of measuring instruments in the formation of quantum phenomena” [13], p.
233. For Bohr, this reflects the peculiarity of measurement at the atomic scale:
“individual atomic processes. . . , due to their very nature, are determined by
the interaction between the objects in question and the measurement instru-
ments necessary for the definition of the experimental arrangement” [19]; the
significance of experimental arrangements underlies the notion of context in
the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics.
Although both Bohr and Heisenberg recognized that the quantum state
does not provide a precise specification of all values corresponding to classical
physical quantities, they rejected the notion of its incompleteness. In partic-
ular, Bohr and Heisenberg rejected the view that the quantum state should
be supplemented by hidden variables rendering it statistical mechanical in
that sense, of which they were quite aware. Indeed, it was Heisenberg who
introduced, in the mid-1930s, the distinction between noncontextual and con-
textual hidden variables. The term context itself, however, was to arise in the
later search for supplementats to the quantum mechanical state description
that might help account for nonlocally appearing correlations of outcome of
measurements performed on compound, spatially distributed systems of the
sort later considered in Bell-type inequalities in the 1960s, that is, the pos-
sibility of the viewing ψ as a statistical state within a more complete theory
involving additional variables that could provide an ostensibly more specific
physical state description at atomic and lower scales. Abner Shimony, one of
the notable later analysts of hidden-variables accounts, explicitly introduced
the terminological distinction between the so-called “contextual(istic)” and
“noncontextual(istic)” hidden-variable models (cf. [20], Ref. 8) in 1971: “The
name contextualistic was introduced by A. Shimony: Experimental test of
local hidden variable theories, in B. d’Espagnat ed.: Foundations of Quan-
tum Mechanics (Academic, New York (1971), and a shortening to contextual
was performed by E.G. Beltrametti and C. Cassinelli: The Logic of Quantum
Mechanics (SIAM, 1983)” [20].
Shimony identified these two sorts of models as being first explicitly
considered (though without using this terminology) by Bell in 1966 [1]. How-
ever, arguably, such a distinction was recognized by Heisenberg already in
1935 in works mentioned further below and related to his reaction to the EPR
paper [21]. For noncontextual such models—those simpler than their contex-
tual counterparts, i.e. those in the complement of the set of such conceivable
models—physical systems are to be fully describable at a given instant via a pu-
tative complete state λ—the parametric specification of the classical mechani-
cal phase space point of a system serving as the archetype—and the outcomes
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of measurement of all properties, obtained as functions A(λ), B(λ), C(λ) . . .
are independent of each other, regardless of when they are performed, and so
are also jointly obtainable [20]. In the “contextualistic” case, this is not so—
indeed, outcomes may depend on the state of system, any hidden variables,
and/or any aspect of the measurement apparatus and its environment. A proof
of Belinfante and others effectively demonstrated the viability of contextual
hidden-variables models and quantum mechanics in a 1973 publication [22], cf.
[20] Ref. 12. The relation of state complementarity to context is the subject
of the next section.
The measurable observable is formalized as a Hermitian operator Oˆ in
the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics and replaced the classical
representation of physical magnitudes by real functions (possibly including
hidden variables). The setting for the later, formal introduction of contextual-
ity was assisted by von Neumann’s demonstration that such sharp observables
are jointly measurable if and only if they commute with one another, pro-
viding a mathematical representative conducive to later and broader ranging
pursuits of (non)contextuality. For example, that it can be shown that there
is order-dependence in the sequence of two sharp measurements if and only
if their corresponding observables commute, so that two different contexts
may each involve one of a pair of noncommuting, so incompatible observables.
In addition, an assumption of von Neumann’s infamous no-go theorem for
hidden-variables theories provided a setting in which later workers could more
precisely formulate different notions of (non)contextuality. These points are
discussed further in Section 4, below.
In the view of Bohr and Heisenberg, the physical state and observables
of quantum mechanics differ in the ways mentioned above from the corre-
sponding classical mechanical elements; morever, for them, the results of any
information-yielding measurement arise in the presence of irreversibility and
“the essentially new feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena is . . . the
introduction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring apparatus
and the objects under investigation” [18], p. 4. In their view, the specifica-
tion the full circumstances of measurements and sets of measurements, which
corresponds mathematically to sets of Hermitian operators, combine with the
quantum state provide the best possible predictions and explanations of quan-
tum phenomena. The Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics—while
not denying the completeness of the quantum state as a description of the
quantum system itself in any empirically meaningful sense—requires the spec-
ification of the physical setting of measurements, and requires that it be done
in a way that nontheless preserves its notion of objectivity. “The recognition
that the interaction between the measuring tools and the physical systems
under observation constitutes and integral part of the quantum phenomena
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has. . . forced us. . . to pay proper attention to the conditions of observation”
[23], p. 74.
In this approach, context specification ultimately involves the disposi-
tions of all physical systems implicated in the measurement of the system and
is an essential aspect of its quantum measurement theory. When the state of
an individual system can be precisely (sharply) measured, it can be given by a
vector |ψ〉 ∈ H and, for Heisenberg, it then “no longer contains features con-
nected with the observer’s knowledge. . . it is also completely abstract . . . the
representation becomes a part of the description of Nature only by being linked
to the question of how real or possible experiments will result. . . ” [24], p. 26.
Heisenberg’s view of measurement involves contextuality in that it is under-
stood that any quantum system is nontrivially open when being measured in
any verifiable way, in that the influence of the measuring apparatus cannot be
neglected in the way it can in classical physics in principle, i.e. in appropriate
limits, due to the non neglibibility of the quantum of action, with the clear
implication of order-dependence of measurement outcomes in some cases.
Heisenberg argued that, in order to communicate system data accu-
rately the apparatus itself as well as any apparatus measuring it, and so on,
also must subject to the same requirements, thus, conceivably involving much
of the universe—at least those portions within the backward light cone of
the components of the chain of systems between the observed system and the
device registering the measurement outcome. He argued that once a measure-
ment begins, “we must take into consideration the interaction of the system
with the measuring apparatus and use a statistical mixture in the mathe-
matical representation of the larger system composed of the system and the
apparatus. . . this could in principle be avoided if it were possible to separate
the system and the measuring apparatus, as a compound system, from the ex-
ternal world”, ibid.. However, the last is not the case in realistic measurement
situations; in the Copenhagen approach, it suffices that these involve large
apparatus, cf. [25], pp. 211, 228. Heisenberg credits Bohr with indicating
the necessity of viewing quantum mechanics in this way. “Bohr has rightly
pointed out on many occasions that the connection with the external world
is one of the necessary conditions for the measuring apparatus to perform its
function, since the behaviour of the measuring apparatus must be capable of
being registered as something actual, and therefore of being described in terms
of simple concepts, if the apparatus is to be used as a measuring instrument
at all, and the connection with the external world is therefore necessary”, [24],
p. 26. Thus, even the joint system of measuring apparatus and measured
object together alone cannot be a closed physical system but its full physical
situation—including which other quantities might be (in)capable of being mea-
sured using it, the interval of time involved in the measurements considered,
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and any changes within it that might take place during that interval—must
also be taken into account.
Bohr’s position is very strong and requires that all measurement is es-
sentially contextual in this way and that any set of measured properties itself is
dependent on the entire, classically describable measurement situation. More
specifically, for him, in order to provide this one has “no choice but to use ev-
eryday concepts, perhaps refined by the terminology of classical physics, not
only in all accounts of the construction and manipulation of the measuring
instruments but also in the description of the actual experimental results. . . ”
[19], p. 26. That is, Bohr held that to the extent that any measurement
provides meaningful data about a quantum system, the experimental arrange-
ment involved must be specified and specified classically and fully, within the
constraints of causality, cf. [18], p. 5. On the Copenhagen approach, the
classically describable experimental situation is an essential element of the
measurement of any set of compatible physical magnitudes.
3 Completeness and Contextuality
The Copenhagen approach to measurement denies the possibility of measuring
atomic-scale systems independently of the (classical) specification of the cir-
cumstances of measurement, as seen above. Bohr summarized this novelty of
quantum mechanics as follows. “While, within the scope of classical physics,
the interaction between object and apparatus can be neglected or, if necessary,
compensated for, in quantum physics this interaction thus forms an insepara-
ble part of the phenomenon. Accordingly, the unambiguous account of proper
quantum phenomena must, in principle, include a description of all relevant
features of the experimental arrangement” which is to be specificied classically
but is necessitated by the unavoidably quantum nature of action involved in
all physical interactions [18], pp. 3-4. Regarding the completeness of quantum
mechanics, Bohr argued that “It is against this [the above] background that
quantum mechanics may be seen to fulfil all demands on rational explanation
with respect to consistency and completeness. . . Moreover, a completeness of
description like that aimed at in classical physics is provided by the possi-
bility [within it] of taking every conceivable experimental arrangement into
account.” [18], p. 6.
Heisenberg argued that it is impossible to further complete quantum
mechanics by exploiting the division of the elements involved in measurement
into those which are chosen to be described classically (the apparatus) and
those which are quantum (the object system) or by altering them in any way.
Indeed, he already presented a specific arguments to this effect in 1934-5,
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having even as early as 1927 argued against the possibility of doing so using
(what are now called contextual) hidden variables [26, 27]. In fact, it was at
this point that a distinction between contextuality and noncontextuality vis-a`-
vis hidden variables models was first made in the second section of his response
to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR). “And we assume specifically: this
statement should hold independently of the means of observation that are
used to detect the α-particles. One might at first be tempted to drop this
last special assumption, and take into account that the radioactive emission
can also depend on the properties of the means of observation”; cf. [27], Sect.
3.2. Thus, Heisenberg clearly “recognises as a separate assumption that hidden
variables are to be considered independently of the means of observation” ([27],
emphasis mine), that is, to be noncontextual versus the more nontrivial case
wherein context must be taken into account.
Heisenberg noted that even in a classical situation if the system un-
der measurement and the apparatus are not entirely separate from the rest
of the world even knowledge of every detail of the system and apparatus may
be of “no avail” for prediction measurement outcomes—for example, in mea-
surements of the temperature of a metal—because it is impossible to know
the full disposition of the entire world, “we do not know every detail of the
external world” ([24], p. 26) and we cannot know it. The difference is that
this is always the case for the measurement of a quantum system: We “use
a statistical mixture in the mathematical representation of the larger system
composed of the system and the apparatus. . . ”, something which “could in
principle be avoided if it were possible to separate the system and the mea-
suring apparatus, as a compound system, from the external world” (ibid.),
that is, for the full measurement situation to be neglected; but, as indicated
above by Bohr, this is never possible when a quantum system is measured. In
quantum mechanics it is not that there is “an analogy to the familiar recourse
to statistics in the description of physical systems of too complicated a struc-
ture to make practicable the complete definition of their state necessary for
a deterministic account. In the case of quantum phenomena, the unlimited
divisibility of events implied in such an account is, in principle, excluded by
the requirement to specify the experimental conditions”, ibid.
Heisenberg’s analysis of measurement, formulated in reaction to the
EPR paper, indicates that considerable freedom does exist in the specification
of this classical measurement context for the measurement of a given charac-
teristic, in that a change in the location of the division between measuring
system and measured system makes no difference to the statistics obtained for
the purposes of prediction, although “this cut may indeed be shifted arbitrarily
far in the direction of the observer in the region that is otherwise described
according to the laws of classical physics; [it is only that] this cut cannot be
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shifted arbitrarily in the direction of the atomic system. Rather, there are
physical systems—and all atomic systems belong among these—that the clas-
sical concepts are unsuitable to describe, and whose behaviour can therefore
be expressed correctly only in the language of wavefunctions”, which includes
the quantum observables [26].
The most pertinent element of this in relation to contextuality is the
associated notion of objectivity: In an objective measurement, the result can
depend neither on the specific identity of apparatus used nor the observer
making the measurement, that is, their identities are not essential but rather
incidental aspects of these elements of the formal measurement context; it
is only their functional role and physical characteristics that matter. The
objective character of the registration process essential to measurement does
not involve subjectivity. Heisenberg explained this as follows. “Of course,
the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that
some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of
Nature. The observer has rather only the function of registering decisions, i.e.
processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an
apparatus or a human being . . . It must also be pointed out that in this respect
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is in no way positivistic. For
whereas positivism is based on sensual perceptions of the observer as elements
of reality, the Copenhagen interpretation regards things and processes which
are describable in terms of classical concepts, i.e. the actual, as the foundation
of any physical interpretation” [24], p. 22. Bohr made this point clearly as
well, “The description of atomic phenomena has in these respects a perfectly
objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any
individual observer. . . ” [18], p. 3.
This conception of quantum measurement context is also not opera-
tionalist in the sense of Bridgman who, for example, opined that, for example,
“The concept of length is fixed when the operations by which length is mea-
sured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much as and nothing
more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general,
we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept
is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.” [28], p. 5, [29].
“In principle the operations by which length is measured should be uniquely
specified. If we have more than one set of operations, we have more than
one concept, and strictly there should be a separate name to correspond to
each different set of operations”, [28], p. 10. Such a requirement of unique
specification is, on the Copenhagen approach, unacceptable in physics as it
would thereby be rendered subjective in that the specific observer or specific
tools involved in measurement become entirely inextricable from what it is
that is measured, while objective physics is about the physical world and not
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its observation. Thus, although measurement requires the full specification of
experimental circumstances, an experimental context is only an equivalence
class of physical arrangements corresponding to successful measurements of a
given set of sharp observables {Oˆi} such that the statistics of measurement of
each of its observables is unchanged by the measurement of its others.
4 Complementarity and Contextuality
Perhaps the greatest significance of quantum contextuality on the Copenhagen
approach is to be found in the fact that if the experimental context is changed,
the statistics of some of its measurement outcomes become different. In partic-
ular, any attempt to provide an analysis in which the object of measurement
is measured more comprehensively than in a complete set of compatible sharp
measurements by the measurement of other physical magnitudes will involve
such a change of context and hence of outcome statistics.
The incompatibility of quantum observables corresponding to different
measurement contexts is, on the Copenhagen view, ultimately an expression
of complementarity. The need for the explicit consideration of experimental
contexts in physics according to the approach is due to the omnipresence of
the quantum of action, which is non negligable at atomic scales and below and
concomitant to a complementarity that is not exhibited in classical physics.
“Within the scope of classical physics, all characteristic properties of a given
object can in principle be ascertained by a single experimental arrangement,
although in practice various arrangements are often convenient for the study
of different aspects of the phenomena. . . In quantum physics, however, evi-
dence about atomic objects obtained by different experimental arrangements
exhibits a novel kind of complementary relationship. . . Far from restricting our
efforts to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion of
complementarity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by such in-
quiry, whenever the interaction between the measuring instruments and the
objects forms an integral part of the phenomena” [18], p. 4.
The relationship between the quantum state and an actual measure-
ment outcome indicated by a classically describable apparatus introduced by
Heisenberg appeared later in Dirac’s textbook Quantum Mechanics as follows.
“If a state ψr and an observable α are such that, when an observation is made
of the observable with the system in this state the result is certain to be the
number a, we assume this information can be expressed by the equation
αψr = aψr . (1)
Conversely, when an equation of this type is given, we assume it has the phys-
ical meaning that a measurement of the observable α with the system in state
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ψr will certainly give for result the number a or that the observable α has the
value a for the state ψr, to use a classical way of speaking, which is permissi-
ble in this case” [11] (p. 30). Accordingly, due to complementarity—manifest
in the mutual exclusivity of differing experimental contexts—a determination
of the quantum state at one moment in general precludes its exact specifica-
tion in the future due to the linearity of the time-evolution transformation
of the quantum state. Thus, the formalism of quantum mechanics naturally
incorporates the fact that context is an essential aspect of measurement: every
measurement of a set of observables corresponds to the sort of conditions under
which it is made (i.e. the specific context) and some of these can be mutually
incompatible, and similarly for sequences of measurements which can exhibit
order-dependence.
Two total experimental situations are incompatible if and only if they
correspond to different contexts, i.e. different equivalence classes in the sense
of measuring sets of physical magnitudes symbolized by noncommuting (oper-
ator) observables. Bohr put this as follows. “These circumstances find quan-
titative expression in Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations which specify the
reciprocal latitude for the fixation, in quantum mechanics, of kinematical and
dynamical variables required for the definition of the state of a system in clas-
sical mechanics itself. In fact, the limited commutability of the symbols by
which such variables are represented in the quantal formalism corresponds to
the mutual exclusion of the experimental arrangements required for their un-
ambiguous definition.” [18], p. 5. As a consequence, propositions regarding
quantum properties are complementary to specific other sets of propositions,
precluding their joint sharp attribution due to the linear structure of the state
space: Every pure state is a nontrivial linear combination of eigenvectors of
observables with which the associated one-dimensional projection fails to com-
mute. Thus, for example, spatial position is almost indeterminate when the
momentum is specified in the limit of perfect precision, and vice-versa. Von
Neumann formalized this incompatibility by showing that sharp quantum ob-
servable are jointly measurable if and only if they commute with one another,
and if and only if they are functions of a single observable, cf. [15], Sect. III.
3. The order of measurements is significant. The statistics of measurement
of two quantum observables Aˆ and Bˆ, which can be measured in one of two
sequences, either Aˆ first or Bˆ first, i.e., as AˆBˆ or BˆAˆ, may or may not have
equivalent results; order-independence implies commutativity [Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0ˆ and
vice-versa, cf. [30]. In addition, there are no order independent sequences of
measurements for complementary pairs of observables, cf. [31].
Von Neumann’s infamous no-go argument against hidden-variables mod-
els provides a valuable setting for the emergence of later precise formulations
of (non)contextuality; he made the assumption, which holds for quantum me-
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chanical operators that, for any system state, the expectation of any measured
quantity C that is a linear combination of two others, A and B, will be the
same linear combination of the expectation values of A and B, with the conse-
quence that the definite values of these quantities v(A), v(B), v(C), determined
by the state λ appearing in the hidden-variable model under consideration will
be similarly related, i.e. v(C) in terms of v(A) and v(B) in the same linear
combination. This assumption is reasonable for compatible observables but for
noncommuting observables is less so. This can be seen by considering Bell’s
simple example of the triple of the spin-1/2 in the directions x and y, and their
evenly weighted normalized linear combination, showing such a relation to be
violated [1]. This is not a plausible requirement for a hidden-variable theory.
In particular, the work of von Neumann in the spirit of Copenhagen set
the stage for later investigations of contextuality as a dependency of sets of
measurement outcomes on measurement arrangements. Kochen and Specker’s
(KS) approach—in proving the Kochen–Specker theorem demonstrating there
are sets of quantum observables that cannot have values consistently assigned
values to them by an important class of hidden-variables models—avoided von
Neumann’s overly strong assumption by making it only for sets of all mutually
compatible observables such as the triples {A,B,C}, which is a noncontex-
tuality assumption [2]; Bell [1] and Mermin [32] were later to work similarly
with additivity assumptions regarding only compatible observables. The as-
sumptions of KS follow from the more general assumption relating to the
composition of functions [33]: Let Aˆ be a self-adjoint operator associated with
observable A, let f : R→ R be an arbitrary function, such that fˆ(Aˆ) is another
self-adjoint operator, and let |ψ〉 be an arbitrary state; then fˆ(Aˆ) is associated
uniquely with an observable f(A) such that v(f(A))|ψ〉 = f(v(A))|ψ〉, the |ψ〉
indicating the possibility of state-dependence of values. This allows enables a
specific sense of contextuality, by considering the case in which an observable
f(Q) has a single referent in the measurement setting: even if in the quantum
case, two functions of the sharp, noncommuting quantum observables Qˆ and Pˆ
are the same function, as they are in the constuctions involved in the proof of
the KS-theorem, they could represent different observable quantities, because
finding v(f(Q)) requires the measurement of Q while finding v(g(P )) requires
measuring P , with the possibility that Q and P are incompatible observables
due to the different contexts of measurement involved.
5 Conclusion
An early notion of quantum contextuality is shown here as it appears in the
Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, namely, as a dependence of
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the outcome of one measurement on other measurements performable on the
given system due to the experimental arrangement for measuring each, and the
quantum context is the equivalence class of experimental arrangements for the
measurement of a compatible set of sharp observables the statistics of which
are not influenced by other measurements within them. Bohr and Heisenberg
articulated the significance in any measurement of the specification of such
contexts and how this is associated with the novelty of the quantum formal-
ism: For Bohr, contextuality is an immediate consequence of complementarity,
which he believed capable of extension beyond quantum mechanics, and it is
indicated by the incompatibility of sharp measurements. The quantum context
was expressed formally in terms of the noncommutativity in general of sharp
observables demonstrated by von Neumann, whose later imperfect critique of
hidden-variables models for reproducing the statistics of their measurement
set the stage for the later exploration of different notions of contextuality in
and beyond quantum physics.
Thus, the early insistence of Bohr and Heisenberg on the essential de-
pendence of measurement outcomes on measuring arrangements provided an
early notion of context, while von Neumann’s work formalizing the relation-
ship of measurement arrangements to the algebra of quantum operators and
his no-go arguments, and Heisenberg’s identication of their relation to possi-
ble hidden-variables in the 1930s enabled subsequent explorations of quantum
contextuality in and beyond quantum mechanics up until the present.
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